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Abstract: Most of current industries and their critical infrastructure rely heavily on the Internet for 
everything. The increase in the online services and operations for various industries has led to an 
increase in different security threats and malicious activities. In US, the department of homeland 
security reported recently that there have been 200 attacks on core critical infrastructures in the 
transportation, energy, and communication industries (Erwin et al., 2012). This paper is concerned 
with the growing dependence of modern society on the Internet, which has become an ideal channel 
and vital source of malicious activities and various security threats. These threats could have an 
impact on different distributed systems within and across all the critical infrastructures, such as 
industrial networks, financial online systems and services, nuclear power generation and control 
systems, airlines and railway traffic controllers, satellite communication networks, national healthcare 
information systems … etc. The major problem is that the existing Internet mechanisms and protocols 
are not appropriately designed to deal with such recently developed problems. Therefore, a rigorous 
research is required to develop security approaches and technologies that are capable of responding 
to this new evolving context. This paper presents various security threats and incidents over the past 
recent years on different critical infrastructure domains. It introduces some security measures 
including vulnerability assessment and penetration testing approaches for critical infrastructure. 
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1. Introduction 
Critical infrastructure cyber security is concerned with the protection and response to malicious 
activities that involve the critical infrastructure of a particular country. It is about the protection of 
electronic systems from malicious electronic attack and the means of dealing with such attacks. 
Critical infrastructure cyber security comprises technical, operational and managerial activities, and 
relates to the application processes, electronic systems and to the information stored and processed 
by such systems. During recent years the context of cyber security threats to critical infrastructure has 
changed dramatically as the Web and Internet technologies have driven the global expansion. In 
Europe, the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) is concerned with the 
protection of critical infrastructure in the EU. The EPCIP developed a procedure for identifying and 
designating European Critical Infrastructure (ECI), which is implemented by the European 
Commission’s directive EU COM (2006) 786. This directive indicates that European critical 
infrastructure represents a situation that in case of a security incident or violation, which may affect a 
hosted country and at least one other European Member State. 
 
Critical infrastructure systems are increasingly being targeted by attackers. This is due to the fact that 
most of such systems rely on weak security mechanisms. Cyber security threats include such issues 
as energy and power generation failures, online banking systems malfunction, transportation 
accidents, and hazardous material accidents. Figure 1 shows different infrastructure that were 
commonly referred to as “critical”. In December 2011, the FBI’s cyber division released the news that 
the infrastructure systems of three US cities have been attacked. FBI reported that hackers hit key 
services and had accessed crucial water and power services (BBC News, 2011) 
 
"We just had a circumstance where we had three cities, one of them a major city within the US, where 
you had several hackers that had made their way into SCADA systems within the city.” and 
“Essentially it was an ego trip for the hacker because he had control of that city's system and he could 
dump raw sewage into the lake, he could shut down the power plant at the mall - a wide array of 
things" 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Examples of Critical Infrastructure 
 
In 2010, another major security violation incident took place that was the spread of Stuxnet malware. 
Stuxnet is a complex piece of malware believed to be the first to target a real critical infrastructure 
such as nuclear power station. It is considered as one of the most sophisticated worms ever detected 
that uses six different methods that allowed it to spread (Fildes, 2010). Unlike most malware, Stuxnet 
aims to target specific industrial control systems that are traditionally not connected to the internet for 
security reasons using USB keys. It is designed to spy on and reprogram industrial control systems 
and to seek out a specific configuration of Siemens made SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition) systems. Once SCADA system is hijacked by Stuxnet, the worm can reprogram PLC 
(Programmable Logic Controller) to give new instructions to linked machine. This is to cause damage 
to motors used in uranium-enrichment centrifuges. The PLC is an electronic device that generates 
control signals, for example, it monitors temperature and turn on coolers if a gauge exceeds a certain 
temperature as part of an industrial process. Stuxnet is able to inject code into the ladder logic of 
PLCs, monitor Profibus protocol and then manipulates the operations of the PLC to interrupt 
processes and modify output (Knapp, 2011). Stuxnet is a kind of malware that cannot be detected 
until it has been deployed and it infects parts of the control system that is uneasy to monitor. 
Therefore, security professionals need to change their perception and attitude toward critical 
infrastructure security to be able to deal with such malicious incidents (Symantec, 2010). 
 
In 2010, Symantec carried out a critical infrastructure protection study. This study included 1,580 
private businesses that are involved in industries that are considered providers of critical infrastructure 
services. The respondents are companies from 15 countries worldwide, with median company had 
between 1,000 and 2,499 employees. Figure 2 shows the results of one of the companies’ responses 
to a question about the company’s experience with four different types of attacks (Symantec, 2010). 
The results show that average of only 29% were completely sure these attacks never happened in 
their companies. The rest i.e. about 71% were either not completely sure, suspect or pretty sure that 
those attacks have happened to their companies. Such statistics indicate that there is a lot of work 
needs to be done by all parties involved including management, security professionals, governments 
… etc. to improve the situation. 
  
 
Figure 2: Symantec Survey of Critical Infrastructure based Companies in 2010 
 
Security experts predict that there will be an increase in such attacks and malicious activities due to 
lack of knowledge about cyber security threats and lack of proper security measures. Therefore, 
proper cyber security training and intelligent security measures need to be considered in order to be 
able to address recent sophisticated kind of threats. This includes monitoring application sessions and 
defining up to the level security policies to control all internal processes and communications (Knapp, 
2011). In Europe, Member States are pursuing Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) initiatives aimed 
at working with different organisations and industries to address cyber security threats. 
 
2. Critical Infrastructure Security Threats 
Critical infrastructure represents a system or a number of systems that perform critical functions and 
operations. Such systems are considered critical if they could impact any other critical processes 
and/or devices, or provide a pathway/channel to other critical system(s), or are used to protect critical 
systems (Knapp, 2011) (US (NRC), 2010). Figure 3 shows a general logical diagram provided by the 
US. NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) for identifying critical systems (US (NRC), 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: NRC Flow Diagram for Identifying Critical Systems 
 
  
Manipulating a particular process in a critical system could cause certain threshold levels to build 
beyond safe operating parameters which then could result in loss of life and/or loss of critical services. 
Such a manipulation event could be performed using a Man-in-the-Middle attack to change control 
process parameters and its feedback loop using a targeted malware. For example, a successful 
cyber-attack can block, delay or manipulate the intended operation, thereby preventing a service 
provider from generating necessary energy output or from obtaining production metrics. This section 
presents various security threats and violations over the past recent years on different critical 
infrastructure domains including industrial networks, healthcare services, telecommunication 
networks, and banking systems. 
 
2.1 Industrial Networks 
An industrial network performs an operational process of a control or manufacturing system to carry 
out a particular operation. It consists of a supervisory network, business network of enterprise 
operations and control process networks (Knapp, 2011). The increasing persistence and 
sophistication of attacks on industrial networks in general and energy systems in particular requires 
effective solutions that are capable of mitigating such attacks. In 2009, the International Chief Security 
Officer (CSO) of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) reported that (Ghansah, 2009) 
 
“The electric grid is highly dependent on computer‐based control systems. These systems are 
increasingly connected to open networks such as the internet, exposing them to cyber risks.” 
 
Various entities such as hacking individuals, organizations and even states are involved in probing 
U.S. power grid systems on a daily basis. In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
reported that (Ghansah, 2009) 
 
“Cyber spies, likely from China and Russia, have managed to inject malicious software into the 
electric grid, water, sewage, and other infrastructure control software. This software could enable 
malicious users to take control of key facilities or networks via the Internet, causing power outages 
and tremendous damage to all sectors of the economy.” 
 
Satellite imagery of nuclear power stations and power grids can easily be located online using Google 
map. Online vulnerable systems and components such as unsecured servers, SCADA systems and 
network resources are remotely accessible to anyone with an Internet connection and with a basic 
knowledge of using attacking tools. The SQL Slammer Worm is one of those tools that are able to 
disrupt electric system control systems. Cyber-attacks incidents could result in shutting down portions 
of power plants, breaking into electrical utilities, disturbing cities lights and electricity, grid failures or 
catastrophic problems (Vaas, 2012) (Andres and Loudermilk, 2012) (Ghansah, 2009). IOActive 
discovered security vulnerability in many Smart Meters, where a malware managed to spread quickly 
throughout a neighbourhood, affecting the electric system controls, causing power disruptions and 
calibration modifications rendering the power meters inoperable (Davis, 2009). 
 
Industrial networks have moved towards more effective mechanisms of managing industrial systems 
such as power generation and distribution. Such systems have become to rely on networked SCADA 
systems that use network protocols and about 85% of all analogue relay systems such as meters, 
demand response systems, control systems … etc. are now digital (Andres and Loudermilk, 2012). 
Most of the industrial network protocols are sensitive to DoS attacks that using a significant amount of 
overwhelming traffic could lead to protocol failure. Improper digital network configurations often lead 
to information leaks between SCADA systems, business networks and the Internet and pose a 
significant threat to network reliability. Network information leaks can allow worms and/or hackers to 
disabling safeguards and have a direct access to vulnerable SCADA systems (Ghansah, 2009). The 
end result could be taking a service offline, production failures, financial losses, life-threatening 
incident due to misinformation.  
  
The SCADA systems are built using public or proprietary communication protocols such as Profibus. 
Those protocols are used for communicating between an MTU (Master Terminal Unit) and one or 
more RTUs (Remote Terminal Units). The SCADA protocols provide transmission specifications to 
interconnect master station and substation computers, RTUs, IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices) 
(Ghansah, 2009). Profibus is one of the common industrial protocols which were developed to 
achieve interoperability among systems in the energy utility. An attacker with the appropriate network 
reconnaissance techniques can access captures and analyses Profibus messages. This attack 
provides the attacker with information about network topology, device functionality, memory 
addresses and other data. A hacker can launch a replay attack with knowledge of normal Profibus 
traffic patterns simulates responses to the master while sending fabricated messages to outstation 
devices (Ghansah, 2009). Figure 4 shows some common industrial network vulnerabilities and 
security threats such as poor firewall configurations, insecure wireless links, weak control access 
mechanisms, remote access vulnerabilities … etc. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Industrial Network Security Threats 
 
As an intelligent malware Stuxnet manages to inject code into the ladder logic of PLCs, monitors 
Profibus protocol and then manipulates the operations of the PLC to interrupt control processes and 
modify operation results. Profibus is an industrial protocol developed by the Central Association for 
the Electrical Industry in Germany. It is a Master/Slave protocol that uses a token for communications 
between a master and one or more slaves. A master Profibus node represents a PLC or RTU and a 
slave is sensor or other control system device. One of the major limitations of Profibus is lack of 
authentication to many of its functions allowing for unauthorised control over all slaves. This could 
result in disrupting the protocol functions or injecting code into a slave node. Stuxnet is able to exploit 
Profibus and compromise a PLC as a master node allowing Stuxnet to issue commands to the 
relevant slave nodes to sabotage the process (Knapp, 2011) (Jonathan, 2010). 
  
2.2 Healthcare 
The emergence of Web-based Healthcare applications has generated various risks to patients 
information security. Malicious software and operations pose a major threat to the security of EPHI 
(Electronic Patient Healthcare Information), especially those supporting medical identity theft and 
healthcare fraud. Moreover, the proliferation of handheld devices, such as smart phones, has created 
an environment in which patients’ wireless communications and healthcare staff emails can be 
intercepted. Lack of effective policies and security controls by healthcare service providers poses a 
security risk in terms of accessibility to patients’ files, such as valid diagnosis and treatment 
information. Recent developed malware is able to exploit various healthcare system vulnerabilities 
and continue to grow. Such problems could have a negative impact on patients and affect the proper 
use of their medication and drugs. This makes healthcare service providers in general, and hospitals 
and patients in particular, at risk. 
 
The critical information attributes which have an impact on a healthcare service provider operations 
are patients’ details/information and network communication information. Table 1 includes definition 
for the assigned impact levels and their possible effects on a healthcare service provider. Definition of 
impact levels in table 1 are meant to help healthcare service provider’s management team to 
understand that the loss of security attributes to those pieces of information (patients’ details and 
network and communications information) can impact the service provider in different ways and 
degrees. 
 
Table 1: Definition of Impact Levels 
 
 
 
Healthcare service providers are leveraging the networked nature of the Internet and want to take the 
full advantage of the Internet and distributed computing to serve their customers/patients. Nowadays 
healthcare services providers are connected to the Internet, have various systems to worry about and 
are facing an increased number of vulnerabilities and security threats. Such threats represent 
conditions with a potential to cause damage to an organisation’s business and/or system resources 
including databases and communication links. Threats may come from a system’s vulnerabilities, 
unauthorised access, an insider performing illegitimate activities, natural disasters such as 
earthquakes, flooding, storms, lightning ... etc. Threats are divided into two types, external security 
threats and internal security threats. Examples of external security threats include denial of service 
(DoS) attacks, remote brute-force, man-in-the middle attack. Password sniffing, Trojan horses, Data 
tampering are examples of internal security threats. Such attacks are a direct threat to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a healthcare service provider’s information assets. The 
HIPAA (Health Insurance Probability and Accountability Act) security rules and procedures have 
introduced various solutions to minimize such threats and risks. 
  
2.3 Telecommunication Networks 
Computer networks, satellite communication systems and links allow unauthorized users to gain 
access to private information and critical resources. The satellite networks represent one of the major 
communication systems that face significant security challenges. Attacks such as DoS (Denial of 
Service) on satellites could cause business and military communications to become unavailable at 
critical moments and prevent legitimate clients from accessing necessary service(s). Space assets 
satellite systems are increasingly vulnerable to various attacks, such as RF jamming and network 
traffic spoofing. Jamming involves intentionally masking a target signal with another RF signal using a 
little jamming power, which can result in a signal degradation or total signal loss. Spoofing involves 
transmitting false information to the satellite in order to overpower the intended signal. This is to send 
the receiver a malicious signal and fooling it into using a false signal for further processing (Northcutt, 
2007). Such attacks could lead to disruption of communications and prevention of service access. 
 
To attack a satellite does not require a state space capability. The Tamil Tigers Liberation Front 
(LTTE), a Sri Lankan separatist group classified as terrorist group, has recently been blamed for 
illegally using INTELSAT satellites. The LTTE used INTELSAT to broadcast radio and TV 
transmissions via the use of an empty transponder (Ma et al. 2010). Satellite transponders represent 
the access points that are configured to retransmit any signal being sent to them and are susceptible 
to various vulnerabilities. If a transponder has unused bandwidth, a hijacker could easily identify a 
vacant place on the transponder, using a spectrum analyzer, to broadcast their own transmissions. An 
attacker can create a DoS condition by turning on an uplink carrier with a great enough signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) into the victim’s satellite on the same frequency as the intended signal (Daly, 2007). 
The victim transponder processes the incoming carrier frequency along with the intended signal and 
re-transmits both of them down to the receiver. The attacker’s signal may impair the intended signal at 
the receiver making it unable to distinguish the intended signal from the attacker’s signal. Moreover, 
the attacker’s signal raises the background noise of the transponder and causes a reduction in the 
SNR of all the intended signals, which makes them uneasy to recover. With today’s DSP (Digital 
Signal Processing) systems it is becoming trivial to launch such attacks. The uplink signal from the 
hijacker is transmitted to the satellite in a highly directed beam, which makes finding the attacker 
extremely difficult (Daly, 2007). This ability to hack into commercial satellites could lead to a 
disastrous situation in global communications. The development of effective security models and 
solutions is a viable response to the rapidly increasing number of malicious activities on satellite 
systems and Internet services. 
 
3. Security Measures 
It is important for organisations managing critical systems to deploy all necessary security solutions 
and carry out a regular security assessment and auditing. Security assessment must be carried out by 
experienced professionals to gather information and to perform necessary tests. The security 
assessment is a process that includes interview with key personnel managing the critical system, 
review of available systems and documentation and carry out comparisons with relevant standards. A 
security audit is a systematic technical evaluation of an organisation system(s) and service(s) by 
measuring how well they confirm to standards and guidelines provided by different organisations such 
as British Standards (BSs), OSI, NIST … etc. Through these efforts, the assessment team should be 
able to plan a strategy to identify security vulnerabilities and propose solutions to meet the critical 
infrastructure’s security needs. The assessment process includes reviewing the security requirements 
for critical network architecture and addressing the issues of end-to-end communication infrastructure 
uniquely pertaining to critical system communications and access control mechanisms. The 
assessment process should consider technical standards in studying and specifying the requirement 
details and evaluation of system architecture and services in terms of meeting the necessary security 
needs. Effective security assessment includes vulnerability assessment and penetration testing 
services which must be performed regularly to suit critical infrastructure systems as follows:  
 
  
• Vulnerability assessment is concerned with the evaluation of network configurations, firewalls, 
vulnerable critical services and/or systems ... etc. using vulnerability scanners. Vulnerability scanners 
are useful in terms of ensuring the security of services and systems. For example, vulnerability 
scanners could be used to determine if there are any unauthorised activities are occurring or 
information leakage is taking place in a power grid network or in a SCADA system. Figure 5 shows a 
proposed flow chart for a vulnerability assessment to critical infrastructure. 
 
• Penetration test is carried out to perform an external penetration test on all the network systems 
including servers, databases, communication links ... etc. In general, the testing team should not be 
given any prior information about the network architecture. 
 
Such assessment should involve using necessary tools to evaluate, test and analyse the security 
operations and infrastructure. It also should define the countermeasures to security threats and 
violations. Stallings (2011) had identified the necessary countermeasure to major Outsiders and 
insiders’ threats/attacks. Some of the attacks are common for both outsiders and insiders’ threats. In 
Europe, Member States are required to conduct a security assessment of the threats and violations 
relating to the designating ECI. Member States have to report to the EC every two years on the 
security threats, risks and vulnerabilities the various European Critical Infrastructure (ECI) services 
are facing (The EC directive, 2008). The final outcomes and results of the assessment and auditing 
are intended to provide the organisation with recommendations to improve security. 
 
As many organisations are migrating to cloud services, much of their infrastructure will now be 
controlled by a third-party Cloud Service Provider (CSP). The extensive use of virtual machines (VMs) 
in developing cloud infrastructure presents various security concerns for organisations as customers 
of a public cloud service (Winkler, 2012). Migration to cloud environment brings unique security 
challenges to critical systems such as virtual threats. Virtualisation uses more complex processes 
than traditional systems and DoS attacks to VMs have become equally more complex. Therefore, 
relying on protection techniques traditionally implemented against DoS is insufficient. The operating 
system (OS) vulnerabilities on the host system can flow upward into the VM OS. Therefore, a 
compromise of the host OS would allow an attacker to access all VM processes and services. Table 2 
lists the major security Cloud-siders threats and necessary countermeasures (Winkler, 2012) (Krutz 
and Vines 2010) (Winkler, 2011).  
 
Effective critical systems security is based on various factors such as proper policies, procedures, 
management support, and appropriate implementation. Therefore, critical infrastructure requires a 
comprehensive security policy that details not only physical security requirements but also includes 
information protection and systems security considerations. This includes preparation of an 
acceptable-use policy addressing the appropriate use of corporate technology resources and the 
actions management will take resulting from the violation of this policy. Password policies are 
important to specify when passwords must be used, how strong they must be, and how they must be 
stored and processed. The lack of a password policy and appropriate password controls could lead to 
unauthorized access to systems and information. Polices are required to conform to specific 
professional organization such as the OSI’s regulations applicable to the communication or use of 
data. Security policy is the foundation of critical systems security plan and implementation. The lack of 
security policy could have a negative impact on a critical service provider’s performance and ability to 
meet the industry standards and regulations. In Europe, the EPCIP developed a procedure for 
identifying critical assets of the European Critical Infrastructure (ECI), which is implemented by the 
European Commission’s directive 2008/114/EC. This directive insists that Member States must 
ensure that an operator security plan (OSP) is in place for each designated ECI to identify the critical 
assets of the ECI and the available security policies and measures for protecting them (The EC 
directive, 2008). 
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Figure 5: Vulnerability Assessment to Critical Infrastructure 
 
4. Conclusion 
Due to the fact that different critical infrastructure systems reply on weak security mechanisms, such 
systems are increasingly targeted by attackers. Various complex malwares have been developed to 
target improperly protected critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure service providers must seek 
implementing cost-effective and comprehensive secured solutions for their system operations. 
Various critical industries have demonstrated a desire to ensure the security of their systems 
architecture and infrastructure. This paper provided a brief survey to recent security threats and 
vulnerabilities to different critical infrastructure systems including industrial networks, healthcare 
systems, telecommunication services and online banking. For example, Stuxnet is able to inject code 
into the ladder logic of PLCs, manipulates the operations of the PLC to interrupt processes and 
modify output. In this paper, various security measures have been presented including assessment 
process to infrastructure architecture and systems in terms of vulnerability assessment, security 
  
policies, procedures and solutions. In Europe, the European Commission’s directive insists that 
Member States must carry out a security assessment of the threats and violations relating to the 
designating ECI. 
 
Table 2: Cloud-siders Threats and Countermeasures 
 
 
Migration to cloud computing based services and environment brings unique security challenges to 
critical systems such as VM threats. A summary of cloud-siders threats and countermeasures are 
listed in section 3. The lack of proper security policy could have a negative impact on the performance 
of critical systems and ability of critical service providers to meet the industry standards and 
regulations. European Member States must ensure that an OSP is in place for each designated ECI. 
This is to identify the critical systems and assets as well as the available security measures for 
protecting them. Critical infrastructure service providers can improve their security posture by taking 
into consideration the proposed security measures and assessment strategy. The final outcomes and 
results of security assessment and auditing are intended to provide organisations with 
recommendations to improve security. 
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